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     Children who grow up in more highly educated families have better labor market 
outcomes as adults than those who grow up in less educated families, but we do not know 
whether this is because education bestows parents with skills that make them better 
parents or because unobservable endowments that contribute to the parents’ educational 
levels are shared by their children.  This paper attempts to improve our understanding of 
the causal processes that contribute to intergenerational immobility by exploiting 
variation in fathers’ education induced by the World War II G.I. Bill.  I use two different 
identification strategies, both of which rest on the timing of the war:  the G.I. bill had 
different effects on different cohorts depending on their likelihood of military service and 
the probability that their schooling had been completed before the war began. The two 
different strategies establish upper and lower bounds on the causal impact of father’s 
schooling:  I find that a one year increase in a father’s education reduces the probability 
that his child is retained in school by between two to four percentage points.  This implies 
that parental schooling levels have an affect on children’s outcomes that is independent 
of their innate ability and suggests that public policies aimed at increasing educational 
attainment may have important intergenerational effects.  1
Numerous social scientists have documented a positive relationship between the 
education levels of parents and their children, but the processes that drive this 
phenomenon are not well understood.    While estimated intergenerational correlations 
appear to be robust to the inclusion of a wide variety of family background variables this 
is not sufficient to conclude that increasing a parent’s level of education will have a 
causal effect on the next generation’s human capital.   In fact, these correlations may 
reflect unobservable parental endowments such as “ability” that are passed on to children.   
The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of the causal processes 
that contribute to intergenerational immobility by exploiting variation in fathers’ 
education induced by the World War II G.I. Bill.  Quantifying the extent to which a 
child’s human capital can be improved by increasing his parent’s education may shed 
light on the larger debate over whether similarities across generations result from “nature 
vs. nurture.”  It also has important implications for public policy:  most discussions about 
the government’s role in providing educational aid, for example, focus on the individual’s 
return to education and ignore the possibility of social benefits.  Knowing that there are 
intergenerational returns to increased schooling would provide a further rationale for such 
programs.  On a more basic level, understanding how changes in the distribution of 
parents’ socioeconomic characteristics contribute to changes in the corresponding 
distributions for their children is a fundamental part of understanding inequality in 
American society. 
While there already exists a large literature that attempts to identify the causal 
effect of an individual’s education on her own earnings (see Card (2001) for a survey), 
studies that evaluate other possible returns to education are more limited in number.     2
Among these, only a handful attempt to isolate the causal impact of education on the next 
generation’s well-being (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Behrman, Rosenzweig and 
Taubman, 1994; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2005; Chevalier, 2003; Currie and 
Moretti, 2002; McCrary and Royer, 2006; Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, forthcoming; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994).  This is probably due, at least in part, to the fact that it is 
difficult to find plausible sources of identifying variation:  a few studies have used fixed 
effects models to control for parents’ innate characteristics but a drawback of this 
approach is that it is unclear why the parent’s education varies between siblings. Factors 
that contribute to a parent’s changing level of education may also affect his children’s 
outcomes.
1  Other studies have identified the effects of parental education using variation 
in educational opportunities or requirements across geographic areas and over time, but 
these changes may in part reflect changes in other location-specific factors that affect 
children’s outcomes. As in family fixed effects models, the source of the variation in 
geographic-specific educational opportunities or restrictions is usually unknown.  Across 
these studies (which focus on a variety of child outcomes in addition to using different 
estimation strategies) the estimated causal effects of parental education range from large 
and statistically significant to indistinguishable from zero.   
This study introduces two novel sources of identifying variation based on cohort 
level differences in schooling levels induced by the G.I. Bill—variation which I will 
argue is driven simply by the timing of the draft and not by innate individual level 
characteristics or underlying trends.   The dramatic impact of the G.I. Bill on the level of 
                                                 
1 It is also well known that relative to OLS, such estimates are more prone to errors-in-variables bias 
(Griliches, 1979). A less widely appreciated problem is that if the “within” variation in unobserved 
characteristics gives rise to “within” differences in education levels then fixed effects models may actually 
exacerbate omitted variables problems (Bound and Solon, 1999; Griliches, 1979).     3
educational attainment among returning veterans has been well documented (see Bound 
and Turner, 2002; and Stanley, 2003).  Furthermore, the bill had different effects on 
different cohorts depending on the likelihood of military service and the probability that 
an individual had completed his education before the war began.  I use between-cohort 
variation in the probability of military service and G.I. take-up rates to motivate 
instruments that are used to identify the effect of fathers’ educational attainment on 
children’s progress in school.  An advantage of this approach is that the genesis of the 
identifying variation is transparent. 
To be sure, cross-cohort variation in G.I. benefit eligibility will be commensurate 
with both variation in education levels and any residual effects of military service.  A 
particularly nice feature of the two research designs used in this paper is that if such 
effects exist, they will lead to upward biases in one case and downward biases in the 
other.  Thus, the estimates produced by the two estimation strategies can be thought of as 
upper and lower bounds on the true effect of father’s education. 
The two estimation strategies produce strikingly similar estimates.  I find that a 
one year increase in a father’s schooling will reduce the probability that his child repeats 
a grade by between two to four percentage points.  While these estimates are a little 
larger than the estimate I obtain using OLS, the IV and OLS estimates are not statistically 
different from each other.  My results suggest that the observed correlation between 
fathers’ education and children’s grade retention is not driven soley by fathers’ innate 
ability.  This suggests that policies that increase educational attainment may be a 
successful means of reducing inequality among future generations.       4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section I describes the G.I. 
Bill.  Sections II and III outline my estimation strategy and data, respectively, and 
Sections IV and V present the results based on the two identification strategies.  Section 
VI concludes. 
 
I. World War II and the G.I. Bill 
 
The G.I. Bill is widely regarded as one of the most significant education policies 
to have taken place in modern America.  Signed into law on June 22, 1944, it provided 
unprecedented educational aid to returning veterans who had served for at least 90 days 
or had been discharged early because of disabilities acquired during service.  Anyone 
who had served on active duty between September 1940 and July 1947 was eligible for 
support, provided that he began his schooling before July 1951.  The number of years of 
benefits for which a veteran qualified was determined according to the individual’s age 
and length of service, and ranged from one to four years.  Most veterans were eligible for 
all four years of benefits. 
  The G.I. Bill made very generous financial provisions.  It provided full tuition, 
books and supplies towards virtually any institution of higher education in the country, as 
well as a monthly stipend that varied by family size.  Previous studies have estimated that 
for a single veteran this cash allowance was equal to about half the opportunity cost of 
not working, and for a married veteran it was equal to about 70% of the opportunity cost.
2   
                                                 
2 Bound and Turner (2002)   5
  The causal effects of this legislation have been thoroughly investigated by Bound 
and Turner (2002) and by Stanley (2003).
3  Bound and Turner estimate that G.I. benefits 
increased collegiate attainment by about 40%, using between cohort differences in 
military service generated by wartime changes in manpower requirements to identify the 
likelihood that an individual was G.I. eligible.   Stanley’s estimates are based on 
comparisons of postsecondary education levels among cohorts of veterans who were less 
likely to avail themselves of the G.I. Bill because they had already completed their 
education to those who likely entered the military straight out of high school.  This 
estimation strategy suggests that among veterans born between 1923 and 1926 the G.I. 
Bill increased postsecondary education levels by about 20%. 
  These empirical strategies are motivated by concerns about selection into military 
service.    Comparisons of educational attainment between veterans and non-veterans are 
likely to lead to overestimates of the legislation’s effect because one of the primary 
reasons for deferment from WWII service was physical or mental disability.
4  Since 
individuals with low mental capacity probably had lower levels of education than 
average, veteran status alone is unlikely to make a plausible instrument for father’s 
education.   
Bound and Turner’s identification strategy gets around this problem by comparing 
outcomes for birth cohorts whose eligibility fell on either side of the sharp decline in 
manpower needs after 1945.  Figure 1 documents the dramatic variation in WWII 
participation across cohorts.   About 30% of men born in 1910 were enlisted and 
                                                 
3 In a related study, Lemieux and Card (2001) estimate the effect of the Canadian G.I. Bill on education and 
earnings.   
4 Among 19-25 year old men deferred in 1945, for example, 56% were deemed physically or mentally unfit 
(Bound and Turner, 2002).   6
enlistment rates show a rapid increase among those born between 1914 and 1919.  
Military service was voluntary until 1940, when Congress passed the Selective Service 
Act, which mandated registration of young men and required enlistment among those 
who were deemed eligible.  Thus, for cohorts born between 1920 and 1926, who would 
have been subject to the draft, the participation rate was nearly constant at a little over 
80%.  Among those who turned 18 after V-J day (cohorts born after the third quarter of 
1927) service plummeted. Since the draft produces a sharp correlation between benefit 
eligibility and an individual’s birth date, but birth cohort is unlikely to be correlated with 
other innate characteristics, a comparison of education levels between pre-1927 and post-
1927 cohorts provides clean estimates of the effect of military service and the G.I. Bill.   
This study draws on the same identification strategy.  Effectively, I compare 
outcomes for children whose fathers were born between 1923 and 1927 to outcomes 
among children whose fathers were born after 1928.  Since the estimates are identified 
purely off of variation induced by the timing of the draft, they will not reflect innate 
parental characteristics such as ability or motivation.  One way of assessing the 
potentially confounding effect of military service is to conduct a companion analysis 
which focuses on cross-cohort variation among veterans.  Even among cohorts of 
veterans who were close in age and faced similar conscription rates, take-up of the G.I. 
Bill appears to have varied a great deal.    Table I shows that while educational attainment 
at the end of service varied very little across cohorts, benefit take-up rates increased 
substantially from about 36% of veterans born in 1919, to 62% of veterans born in 1927.  
In other words, veterans who reached the age of 18 before the U.S. entered the war were 
less likely to return to school than their younger counterparts.   A number of stories could   7
explain this pattern.  For example, older veterans were more likely than younger veterans 
to have completed their education before being drafted, and would therefore have been 
less likely to obtain additional years of education when they returned.  Because older 
veterans were more likely to have held jobs before entering the military, they were also 
more likely to have had jobs that were waiting for them when they came back.  Finally, 
since older veterans would have had a shorter time horizon over which to recoup their 
educational investments, they would have had less incentive to take-up G.I. benefits 
(although this effect is likely to be small). 
I further exploit this variation to identify the effect of father’s education on 
children’s outcomes.
5  Specifically, using a sample of cohorts with roughly equal 
probabilities of being drafted, and conditioning on veteran status, I estimate predicted 
levels of education for each cohort/veteran cell and use these to create instruments for 
father’s education.  This strategy will allow me to simultaneously control for the direct 
effects of father’s age (cohort) and veteran status on a child’s human capital, and 
resulting estimates will only reflect the residual effects of military service if the effects of 
being a veteran vary across cohorts.  Importantly, such effects would bias the estimates in 
the opposite direction from the estimates generated by variation in conscription rates 
before and after VJ day. 
 
II. Estimation Strategy 
  In order to set ideas, consider a simple model of the relationship between father’s 
education and children’s human capital 
 
                                                 
5 Stanley uses this variation in take-up rates to estimate the effect of the G.I. bill on men’s education.     8
ic ic ic ic ic X FCohort FathEd R ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1  (1) 
 
where R is a relevant outcome for child i whose father belongs to cohort c, FathEd  
measures the educational attainment of the child’s father, FCohort  is a linear variable 
measuring the cohort (by birth year and birth quarter)  to which the father belongs, and 
X is a vector of other family background characteristics including the child’s sex, age, 
quarter-of-birth and family size.  I do not include measures of family income, father’s 
work experience, or mother’s education since these may be affected by educational 
attainment.  The coefficient  1 β  should, therefore, be thought of as capturing the overall 
relationship between father’s education andR .  The analysis will focus only on white 
children since previous studies have shown that the effects of the G.I. Bill were quite 
different across racial groups.
6   
  Since it is impossible to fully observe all family background characteristics that 
belong in X, OLS estimates of  1 β  are likely to be biased.  I attempt to circumvent this 
omitted variables problem by employing an instrumental variables (IV) strategy that 
relies on cross-cohort variation in G.I. benefit eligibility.  To begin with, consider the 
first-stage equation  
ic ic ic ic ic X Post FCohort FathEd μ φ φ φ + + + = 3 2 1 ) 1927 (      (2) 
Where Post1927 is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for cohorts born before 1928 and 
1 for cohorts born in 1928, or after.   If equations (1) and (2) were estimated using 2SLS 
                                                 
6 Turner and Bound (2002) show that it had little effect on the collegiate outcomes of black veterans living 
in Southern states, probably because their educational choices were already so limited.  As a result, the G.I. 
Bill may have exacerbated the education gap between Southern blacks and whites. 
   9
then identification would be based on the abrupt decline in conscription among cohorts 
turning 18 after VJ-Day.  As Figure 1 and Table 1 make clear, the vast majority of men 
born after 1927 would not have been eligible for G.I. benefits provided to WWII 
veterans.  By including a linear trend in both the first and second stage, and focusing on 
cohorts born within narrow windows, it is reasonable to assume that the Post1927 
dummy would do a good job of capturing the part of educational attainment that is 
unrelated to innate parental characteristics, or changes in these characteristics over time. 
  Such a research design would be easy to implement, but the Korean War draft, 
which affected many men born after 1927, makes it hard to interpret.  More than a third 
of the 1928 cohort in my sample served in Korea, and the fraction increases among later 
cohorts.  Like those who served during WWII, Korean War veterans were also eligible 
for educational benefits, but unlike the WWII draft, men who wanted to avoid serving in 
Korea could obtain educational deferments.  This means that estimates based on simple 
comparisons between cohorts who turned 18 on either side of VJ day are likely to be 
compromised by the effects of the Korean War.  Instead of estimating equations (1) and 
(2) I, therefore, estimate the following augmented equations 
ic ic ic ic ic ic ic ic X FCohort Korea Korea FCohort FathEd R ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 * % %   (1a) 
ic ic ic ic ic ic ic ic X FCohort Korea Korea WWII FCohort FathEd μ φ φ φ φ φ + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 * % % %   (2a) 
where %Korea is the fraction of men in the father’s year and quarter-of-birth cell who 
identified themselves as Korean war veterans and the interaction term between %Korea 
and the linear trend allows for the possibility that the Korean conflict may have had a 
differential effect on later cohorts.  This seems likely, as Korean war educational 
deferments were not introduced until 1951.     10
This specification also replaces the Post27 dummy with %WWII—the fraction of 
men in the father’s birth cohort who served during WWII and were thus eligible for G.I. 
benefits.  This allows me to make use of the substantial variation in participation rates 
across quarter-of-birth cohorts who turned 18 right around VJ day.  It is conceptually 
similar to using year and quarter-of-birth dummies as instruments for father’s education, 
but produces a more easily interpretable first stage.   
As Figure 1 shows, there is every reason to believe that this instrument will be 
strongly correlated with father’s schooling.  The success of the identification strategy 
hinges on two additional assumptions, however: 1) innate family background 
characteristics are the same across cohorts, and 2) intergenerational effects of military 
service beyond the effects on father’s education, are small.  With respect to 1)  concerns 
about cross-cohort differences are minimized by including a linear trend and focusing on 
fathers born within a narrow time interval.
7  I have also used data from the 1973 
Occupational Change in a Generation Survey (OCG) to look at the extent to which pre-
service characteristics (an individual’s family income and father’s occupation at age 16, 
whether he lived with both parents at age 16, and his parents’ educational attainment) 
varied across these cohorts.  In no case could I reject the null hypothesis that these 
characteristics were the same across cohorts, although this is partly due to the fact that the 
OCG sample is small and yields large standard error estimates.
8 
The second issue is probably of more concern.  While previous studies have 
concluded that—at least with respect to individual earnings—the effects of WWII service 
were small and negative (Angrist and Krueger, 1994; Lemieux and Card, 2001) in 
                                                 
7 Replacing the linear trend with year-of-birth dummies and quarter-of-birth dummies yields very similar 
results. 
8 Results available upon request.   11
principal one can imagine the bias going in either direction.  Military service may have 
provided some men with skills that improved their children’s outcomes.  In addition, the 
general public viewed returning veterans as heroes, which may have positively influenced 
their social interactions within their families as well as in society at large.  At the same 
time, the stress resulting from combat may have left permanent scars on other fathers’ 
abilities to interact with their children and provide for their families.   
Since a father’s experience in the service may have a direct influence on his 
child’s human capital, I also employ an alternative specification that controls directly for 
father’s veteran status.  Specifically, let 
ic ic ic ic ic ic X C FathVet FathEd R ε β β β β α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1    (3) 
and let the first stage be given by 
ic ic ic ic ic ic ic X FathVet FCohort C FathVet FathEd μ φ φ φ φ δ + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 *     (4) 
where FathVet is a dummy variable indicating whether the father was a WWII veteran, 
and C  is a vector of dummy variables indicating the year and quarter during which the 
father was born.  This specification controls directly for the possibility that military 
service has an effect on the next generation: the exclusion restriction is based on variation 
in the veteran effect across birth cohorts.  Table 1 makes clear that although pre-service 
educational attainment varied little across the cohorts born between 1919 and 1927,
9 
younger cohorts were much more likely to avail themselves of G.I. benefits.  Table 2 
shows that by the time of the 1970 Census, educational attainment varied dramatically 
                                                 
9 Unlike the Survey of Veterans, the OCG suggests that pre-military education levels may have been 
slightly lower among veterans born in the late 1920’s compared to those born in the early 1920’s.  The 
Census also shows higher dropout rates for cohorts born in the mid-late 1920’s.  One interpretation of this 
pattern is that towards the end of the war young men who were eager to do their part in the war dropped out 
of school in order to sign up.  During the height of the war the military did not officially take volunteers, 
however, so instances of this behavior should have been limited.  Regardless, both first and second stage 
estimates are robust to samples that exclude fathers with less than a high school diploma.      12
across cohorts.  Veterans born between 1923 and 1927 had 17% more years of post-
secondary education than veterans born between 1919 and 1922.  Among non-veterans 
belonging to the same birth cohorts, post-secondary educational attainment actually 
declined by 6%.  Thus, the average  difference between veterans and non-veterans, which 
is what the interaction terms capture, grew by 46%.  Together, the tables make a strong 
case that the instrument is strongly correlated with father’s educational attainment.
10 
  This approach will be successful if there is no cross-cohort variation in who 
becomes a veteran; a possibility that is minimized by focusing on cohorts with very 
similar conscription rates.  Furthermore, using the OCG, I find no evidence that 
observable measures of family background prior to military service are correlated with 
FCohort*FathVet.
11  Since father’s veteran status is included in both the first and second 
stage, the instrumental variables estimate will not reflect the average effect of military 
service.   
If there are cross-cohort differences in the effect of WWII (and if they affect the 
next generation), however, then the estimates will reflect those differences.  A reason to 
be concerned about such a possibility is that those born earlier would have been more 
likely to see combat and would have served longer.
12  While I cannot completely rule out 
the possibility that differential military service effects are contributing to the 
identification of the estimated coefficient on father’s education, it is important to note 
                                                 
10 My preferred version of the model specifies this variation as a linear trend because cohort-specific 
deviations away from the trend may reflect variation in unobservable characteristics across cohorts that 
would also affect their children’s outcomes.  A specification that replaces the  FathVet FCohort*  
interaction with a series of cohort dummies interacted with FathVet is also presented, however.  The 
estimates produced by this specification are very similar to those produced in the main analysis.   
11 Results available upon request. 
12 Using data from the OCG, I estimate that among my cohorts average months of service decrease by 2.3 
months for each year of birth.  
   13
that biases resulting from the effects of military service using this specification will be in 
the opposite direction of the biases produced by the first identification strategy.  Thus, the 
two specifications produce upper and lower bounds on the causal effects of education.
13 
    
III. Data 
III.A. Data on Children’s Characteristics 
  The main analysis is based on a sample of children ages 7-15 taken from the 1960 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) and 1970 IPUMS state files, both of 
which consist of individual and household level data from the decennial census.
14     Each 
of these files provides a 1/100 sample of children in the United States.  Children younger 
than age 7 are excluded because they will not have had sufficient time to have been held 
back a grade.  Children older than 15 are excluded in order to avoid under-representing 
those who left home before they completed high school.
15  I exclude any individuals for 
whom information on race, sex, age, or veteran status (fathers only) was allocated.  I also 
exclude individuals who could not be matched to their father, who were not born in the 
United States or whose fathers were not born in the United States.  The sample is limited 
to children whose fathers are white. 
                                                 
13 A third identification strategy that has been suggested would rely on cross-sectional variation in 
conscription rates instead of variation across cohorts.  Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) have shown that 
military mobilization rates varied substantively across states, with the fraction of eligible men who served 
ranging between 41 and 54 percent.  As expected, these cross-state differences are strongly correlated with 
father’s educational attainment.  When I use the mobility rate as an instrument the estimated 
intergenerational effect is quite similar to the estimates based on cross-cohort variation.  However, one 
needs to interpret this estimate very cautiously:  Acemoglu et. al. document correlations between state 
mobilization rates and other state characteristics that may be correlated with children’s outcomes, and when 
these characteristics are included as control variables the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on father’s 
education increases considerably.  This suggests that the instrument is correlated with the error term.  
14 I cannot use the 1% county group and neighborhood files because they do not provide information about 
state of residence for all survey respondents.  State of residence is used to create an accurate measure of 
grade retention. 
15 Information on father’s education is only available for individuals who are still living with them.  
Children older than 15 are more likely to have left home than younger children.   14
  Estimation of equations (1a) and (2a), which use the abrupt change in 
conscription rates following VJ-Day to identify the effect of fathers’ education 
(identification strategy 1), is based on a sample of children whose fathers were born 
between 1923 and 1929-32.  These cohorts are chosen because they are close in age (and 
should thus have had similar life experiences prior to the war), and because the pre-1928 
cohorts faced similar probabilities of being drafted.      The sample includes between 
126,000 and 169,000 child/father pairs, depending on the exact cohorts used. 
  Estimation of equations (3) and (4)  (identification strategy 2) rests on variation in 
G.I. take-up across cohorts of veterans.   Since I want to reduce the possibility that the 
coefficient on the interaction between FCohort and FathVet is picking up cross-cohort 
differences in selection into military service, I focus on a sample of children whose 
fathers had similar probabilities of being drafted.  Figure 1 shows that military service 
was roughly constant among cohorts born between 1919 and 1927.   Participation rates 
ranged from a high of 85% for the 1921 cohort, to a low of 81% for those born in 1927.  I 
focus on a sample of children whose fathers were born between the third quarter of 1918 
and the second quarter of 1927 because these cohorts all had participation rates of over 
80%.  The sample includes 160, 638 child/father pairs. 
  Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for these two samples, along with similar 
statistics for all 7-15 year olds in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses who could be matched to 
their fathers.  As expected, the fathers of the children analyzed in this study are more 
likely to be WWII veterans.  Also, since I focus on cohorts of fathers who would be most 
likely to be eligible for G.I. benefits, it is not surprising that the level of education among   15
the fathers’ in my sample is slightly higher than among all 7-15 year olds.  Otherwise, the 
children in the three samples have very similar characteristics.
16    
The size of this dataset is an enormous advantage in terms of enabling me to 
obtain precise estimates.  Many previous studies of intergenerational education effects 
have been hampered by researchers’ reliance on datasets of fewer than 1,000 
observations.  The main disadvantage of the IPUMS, and the reason that it has not been 
used for intergenerational mobility studies, is that it is a cross-sectional dataset that 
contains little information on children’s outcomes.   Typical measures of children’s 
success, such as test scores or behavioral problems are not collected by the Census,
17  but 
it does contain information on the level of educational attainment obtained by each 
member of the household.  I use this information, together with information on the child’s 
age, birthquarter and state of residence, to determine whether or not his schooling level is 
below the typical grade for his age.  Grade repetition is both a widespread phenomenon in 
the United States and is correlated with many, more commonly used, measures of 
eventual educational achievement.  A recent report from the National Longitudinal Study 
of Adolescent Health, for example, indicates that over 20% of American adolescents have 
repeated a grade (Resnick, et.al. 1997), and Feldman (1997) estimates that in many urban 
districts more than half of all students will be retained.  The likelihood of being held back 
is also highly correlated with family background: in 1995, the probability of being 
                                                 
16 About 10% of children in the 1960 and 1970 censuses could not be matched to their fathers.  These 
children tend to live in families with lower incomes and lower maternal education levels.  Unfortunately, 
my estimation strategy cannot provide any information about how children without co-resident fathers 
would have benefited from higher levels of paternal education. 
17 Measures of longer term outcomes such as wages, labor force participation or teenage childbearing are 
available in IPUMS, but since many of these attributes are relevant only for individuals who are in their late 
teens or older, analyses of these outcomes becomes complicated by the fact that older children are more 
likely to live apart from their family of origin.  If an individual is living outside of his parents’ household 
then there is no way to link him up with his relevant family background characteristics. 
   16
retained was about 40% higher among young adults from low income families relative to 
young adults from middle income families, and about 50% higher for blacks compared to 
whites (National Center for Education Statistics, 1997).   
There is also evidence that grade retention is correlated with other measures of 
children’s success.  The National Center for Education Statistics (1997) for example, 
estimates that approximately one quarter of young adults who had repeated a grade had 
dropped out of school by 1995.  Similarly, Smith and Shepard (1989) find that students 
who have previously repeated a grade tend to have worse academic outcomes than 
similar students who have not repeated a grade.  Since educational attainment and test 
scores are well known to be predictors of adult earnings and health, these studies suggest 
that if we can obtain estimates of the causal effect of family income and parental 
education on the probability that a child repeats a grade, we will also gain insight into the 
causal relationship between these family background characteristics and children’s long-
run success. 
  Determining whether or not a child has repeated a grade is complicated by the fact 
that there is variation across states and over time in the minimum age at school entry, 
incomplete information on school entry cut-off dates across states and over time, and 
questions about the degree to which school districts comply with those dates.  Since I 
cannot directly observe grade repetition, I instead follow Oreopoulos et. al. and classify 
children as repeaters if their educational attainment is below the median for their state, 
age, quarter of birth, and census year cell.  More details about the construction of this 
variable are included in the Appendix. Individuals’ completed education levels are   17
heavily clustered around the median, so that about 18% of children in each cell are 
classified as below grade-for-age.  This fraction compares favorably to other studies.
18  
  Since the dependent variable is binary, all second stage regressions are specified 
as linear probability models.  In order to adjust for the fact that older children have had 
more of an opportunity to repeat a grade, and to adjust for possible gender differences in 
the probability of being held back, the regressions include controls for age, quarter-of- 
birth and gender.  I also control for family size, and include a dummy variable indicating 
that the observation is taken from the 1960 Census since the probability of repeating a 
grade may change over time.   
 
III.B. Data on Father’s Characteristics 
  The 1960 and 1970 Census report father’s completed educational attainment in 
years.  This is the measure of father’s education that is used in the analysis.  A World 
War II Veteran is defined as anyone who served in World War II, and a Korean War 
veteran is defined as anyone who served in the Korean war.     
  The sample is necessarily selected on men who became fathers.  If military 
service altered the likelihood of marriage or the probability of having a child, then the 
children I observe will be somewhat different from a random sample of children who 
would have been born if the war had not taken place.  Using all men in the 1960 and 1970 
censuses, however, I find no evidence that these probabilities vary across the cohorts in 
my sample.
19   
                                                 
18 Oreopoulus et. al. use several measures of grade repetition, including the one used in this study, and find 
that between 10 and 15% of children are classified as repeaters. 
19 It is well known that WWII shifted the timing of births (i.e. the “Baby Boom”).  Cross-cohort differences 
in the probability of having a child are not apparent within the narrow window of cohorts used in this study,   18
  Another potential issue is that cross-cohort variation in the probability of 
experiencing combat and the risk of death may induce cross-cohort variation in 
unobserved characteristics of fathers in my sample.  The sample includes only those men 
who survived the war.  Suppose that more “able” veterans were less likely to be on the 
front-lines.  Since later cohorts of veterans were also less likely to engage in combat, this 
would lead to positive selection among the oldest cohorts in my samples.  I investigate 
this potential problem by estimating the (OLS) rate of return to education for each cohort.  
If older cohorts are more “able” than younger cohorts, one would expect their rate of 
return to be higher.  I find no evidence of differential rates of return--the average rate of 
return among both the pre and post 1927 cohorts is 0.085.  Furthermore, even if this type 
of selection exists, it will bias the estimates produced by the two identification strategies 
in opposite directions.          
   
IV. Estimates Based on Cross-Cohort Variation in Military Service        
IV.A. First-Stage and Reduced Form Results 
  Before   turning to the 2SLS estimates of the effect of father’s schooling on the 
next generation’s human capital, it is useful to demonstrate that the first-stage effect of 
the %WWII variable is strong.  The first column of Table 4 provides estimates of 
equation (2a), along with the F-statistic for the hypothesis that this variable is equal to 0.   
In these and all subsequent regressions, standard error estimates take into account the 
probable error correlation across children born to fathers in the same cohort.  Importantly, 
given my identification strategy, the estimated coefficient on the %WWII variable is 
                                                                                                                                                 
however.  Furthermore, first and second stage regressions used in the main analysis include controls for 
father’s age and family size.   19
positive and statistically significant, indicating that a ten percentage point increase in the 
probability of serving is associated with an increase in father’s years of schooling of 1/10 
of a year.
20   The standard deviation in father’s education is approximately three years, so 
this represents a substantive difference in educational attainment.  Given well-known 
concerns about the usefulness of instrumental variables estimators when first-stage results 
are weak (e.g. Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997) I also present the 
corresponding F-statistic, which is 48.  This is substantially above recommended cutoff 
values. 
  The next column of Table 4 provides the reduced form results.  The post VJ-day 
effect is strong enough to observe a substantive reduced form effect on children’s grade 
repetition: children whose fathers had high probabilities of serving are less likely to have 
repeated a grade than children whose fathers were born later.   A ten percentage point 
increase in the probability of service is associated with a 0.5 percentage point decline in 
the probability of being retained in school.  The sign of the estimate is exactly what one 
would expect if father’s education has a positive effect on children’s human capital. 
 
IV.B. OLS and 2SLS Results 
  Table 5 gives the 2SLS estimates of the effect of father’s education on children’s 
probability of being retained.  For comparison purposes, the OLS estimate is also 
presented in the first column of the table.  Like other studies, this estimate suggests that 
there is a strong correlation between parental education and children’s human capital:  an 
                                                 
20 This estimate is bigger than Bound and Turner’s estimate.  Two factors account for the majority of the 
difference: 1) Bound and Turner estimate the relationship between %WWII and years of college, whereas I 
measure father’s education at all points on the distribution, and 2) my estimates are based on a sample of 
fathers whereas Bound and Turner’s sample includes all men in the cohort.   20
additional year of parental education appears to reduce the probability that a child repeats 
a grade by about 2 percentage points.  What is unclear is the extent to which this estimate 
reflects a causal relationship.   
  The 2SLS estimates presented in the remainder of the table provide some insight 
into this question.  These estimates continue to imply that an increase in father’s 
schooling reduces the probability that a child is held back in school.  Specifically, they 
suggest that raising fathers’ education by one year (about a third of a standard deviation) 
will reduce the probability that their children are retained by between 2 and 4 percentage 
points (a 10-20 % decline).   
  Estimates based on a sample that extends through the 1929 birth cohort are shown 
in column 2.  Restricting the analysis in this way mitigates the possible effect of other 
cross-cohort differences, but it also eliminates cohorts with the least eligibility for G.I. 
benefits.   Comparisons extending the period of analysis through 1930 and 1932 are 
shown in columns 3 and 4.  Since later cohorts have virtually no eligibility for G.I. 
benefits, these comparisons more closely approximate a classic treatment/control 
analysis, but the longer window also increases the potentially contaminating influence of 
other changes taking place over time.  The estimates across the 3 columns are all close to 
0.04. 
  The next three columns of Table 5 show what happens to the estimates when 
somewhat more sophisticated regression models are employed.  Estimates are based on 
cohorts born between 1923 and 1932, but are not sensitive to which cohorts are included. 
Column 5 adds a quadratic trend, and an interaction between the quadratic trend and the 
fraction of the cohort who fought in Korea.  This specification is preferred by Bound and   21
Turner, because it allows the effects of service in Korea to vary across birth cohorts in a 
non-linear way which is possible given that Korean War educational deferments were not 
introduced until 1951.  This specification decreases the magnitude of the point estimate to 
-0.03, but it remains statistically different from zero.   
The estimate in the next column is based on a specification that replaces the 
%WWII variable with a set of cohort specific dummies.   This loosens the linear 
restriction on the instrument, which leads to a smaller, more precisely estimated 
coefficient estimate.   Column 7 shows what happens to the estimates when the 
specifications in columns 5 and 6 are combined.  Specifically, this regression replaces the 
%WWII variable with cohort dummies and includes a quadratic trend and an interaction 
with the quadratic trend and %Korea.   This results in a coefficient estimate that is closer 
to 0.02.
21   The 99% confidence intervals around most of these estimates include the OLS 
estimate, but allow one to reject the hypothesis that the effect of father’s education is 
equal to zero.
22  
  One concern with the identification strategy is that the experience of serving in 
WWII may have had a long-lasting effect on fathers over and above its effect on 
schooling.  There are a number of ways in which military service might have affected 
children’s outcomes beyond its affect on education:  relative to later cohorts, cohorts 
                                                 
21 Though not shown, I have also estimated versions of the model that include state fixed effects. The 
differences in the point estimates are negligible. 
22 I have also experimented with specifications that focus on different parts of the distribution of father’s 
education.  When the sample is restricted to children of fathers who have twelve or fewer years of 
education, the first-stage estimates are weak.  When the sample is restricted to children whose fathers have 
twelve or more years of education the first-stage F-statistic is large compared to the cutoffs recommended 
by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997), and the second stage estimates are 
similar to those presented in Table 5.   22
participating in WWII would have been more likely to be disabled,
23 and more likely to 
have experienced psychological trauma associated with combat.  These effects would 
likely bias the estimates towards zero.  On the other hand, military service might have 
provided some men with skills that improved their labor market opportunities, which 
would bias the estimates upward.  While the last column of Table 5 shows that the 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of several observable measures of the father’s 
socioeconomic success (whether the father is currently married, whether he is employed, 
and the log of family income) it is impossible to completely rule out the possibility that 
military service itself affected fathers in ways which subsequently influenced the next 
generation’s outcomes.  In order to address this concern, I turn to an alternative 
identification strategy. 
 
V. Estimates Based on Cross-Cohort Variation among Veterans 
  In this section I employ an alternative estimation strategy, which allows me to 
directly control for the effect of military service on children’s grade-for-age.    I estimate 
equation (3), which directly controls for WWII veteran status and uses the interaction 
between father’s cohort and veteran status to identify the causal effect of education.  This 
interaction term is highly correlated with father’s education because different cohorts of 
veterans exhibited different propensities to take-up G.I. benefits. 
 
V.A. First-stage and Reduced Form Estimates 
                                                 
23 Bedard and Deschenes (2003) show that WWII service is associated with early mortality and disability.   
Unfortunately, the 1960 Census did not include information about individuals’ health.  The 1970 Census 
does include information about whether the individual is disabled, but information about veteran status and 
disability are not on the same form, so it is impossible to include a measure of disability in my analysis.    23
  First, I demonstrate that the proposed instrument is strongly correlated with 
father’s education by showing the first-stage estimate of equation (4) in the first column 
of Table 6.   I also show the partial F-test for the hypothesis that the FCohort*WWII 
Veteran interaction is equal to 0.   Importantly, given my identification strategy, the 
estimated coefficient  is positive and statistically significant, indicating that veterans born 
in any given year get approximately 8  % of a year (4*0.019)  more schooling than 
veterans born one year earlier.   The F-statistic is 23. 
  The next column of Table 6 provides the reduced form results from regressing 
children’s educational progress on the interaction term.  The first-stage effects are strong 
enough to observe a substantive reduced form effect on children’s grade repetition: 
children whose veteran fathers were born in 1927 are on average 3 percentage points less 
likely to have repeated a grade than children whose fathers were born in 1919.
24  The 
negative estimate is exactly what one would expect if younger veterans are more likely to 
have taken advantage of the G.I. Bill.  Furthermore, it is strikingly similar to the reduced 
form estimate in Table 4:  in both cases the association between a one year increase in 
father’s educational attainment and child’s probability of being at grade-for-age is about 
5 percentage points. 
 
V.B. OLS and 2SLS Results 
  Table 7 gives the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect of father’s education on 
children’s probability of being at their grade-for-age.  These estimates are remarkably 
similar to those presented in Table 5, and hold up across the different samples and 
                                                 
24 This is calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient -0.001, by the 32 birthquarters between the 
beginning of 1919 and the end of 1927.   24
specifications.  Furthermore, the estimated effect of father’s veteran status is very small 
(though very imprecisely estimated) suggesting that military service is likely to have only 
a small influence on the estimates presented in Table 5. 
    In column 2 we see the IV results that are produced by the full sample.  The 
coefficient estimate is -0.036 and the standard error estimate 0.010.  The third column 
excludes children of fathers who were born before 1920 and after 1926.   These cohorts 
are dropped because their probability of being drafted was slightly lower than for the 
others and the characteristics of veterans born in 1919 and 1927 may, therefore, be 
somewhat different than for the rest of the sample.  In fact, excluding these cohorts raises 
the estimated standard error but has no effect on the point estimate.   
  In the next column I present estimates based on a specification that relaxes the 
assumption that the take-up of the G.I. Bill decreased linearly with age.  Here, I replace 
the linear FCohort*WWII Veteran interaction with cohort dummies interacted with 
veteran status.   This is not my preferred specification because the source of the cohort 
specific deviations from trend is not known and could be related to cohort characteristics 
that are correlated with children’s outcomes.   The specification choice is unimportant, 
however, because the estimated coefficient on father’s education is virtually the same. 
  The final column of Table 7 shows how the estimates are affected by adding 
controls for whether the father is married, whether he is working, and the log of family 
income.  If the inclusion of these variables significantly changes the estimated effect of 
father’s education then one might be concerned that the effects of WWII service are 
affecting children’s outcomes through another avenue.  The inclusion of these variables 
barely changes the magnitude of the estimate, however.    25
VI. Conclusion 
  Previous studies have shown that the WW II G.I. Bill had substantial effects on 
men’s educational attainment.  This paper exploits two different features of that 
relationship to estimate the effect of father’s education on children’s accumulation of 
human capital.  I find that a one year increase in father’s schooling reduces the 
probability that his child is behind the typical grade for his age by 2 to 4 percentage 
points.  While the point estimates are not very precise, they are statistically different from 
zero, enabling one to rule out the possibility that innate parental characteristics are the 
only source of the intergenerational correlation. 
  The estimation strategies I employ necessarily identify a combined effect of 
military service and the G.I. Bill.  Importantly, any biases that result from my inability to 
fully control for the separate effects of military service will be in opposite directions 
across the two identification strategies.  The fact that the two approaches yield similar 
results therefore suggests that such biases are likely to be very small.  Taken together, the 
estimates suggest that children’s educational outcomes can be improved by increasing 
their parents’ educational opportunities.  
Since grade retention is negatively correlated with other academic outcomes, the 
positive effect of parental education on children’s grade progression is likely to have 
long-term socio-economic benefits as well.  The results suggest that there are substantive 
social benefits to policies that increase educational attainment beyond increases in an 
individual’s own earnings.  In particular, such policies may help reduce inequality among 
future generations.   26
  My results imply that at least some of the intergenerational transmission of 
inequality can be attributed to environmental influences.  There are many ways in which 
higher levels of parental education might affect a child’s environment, including 
increases in family income, better parenting, and improved social networks.  
Understanding the mechanism by which parental education increases children’s human 
capital is an important question that deserves further research.     27
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Figure 1 
World War II Participation Rates 
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Educational Attainment and Use of GI Benefits among WWII Veterans
As Reported in Bound and Turner (2002)
Year of N Age at Educational Used GI Months Received Years of
Birth Military Attainment  Benefits of GI BA with College 
Discharge at End of Benefits GI Benefits with GI
Service Benefits
1915 143 31.2 11.6 0.27 2.8 0.01 0.01
1916 163 30.4 11.5 0.27 3.2 0.00 0.04
1917 192 29.4 11.1 0.33 4.7 0.03 0.15
1918 237 28.3 11.5 0.37 4.3 0.03 0.21
1919 234 27.3 11.4 0.36 6.0 0.04 0.21
1920 268 26.8 11.4 0.40 6.0 0.06 0.32
1921 324 25.5 11.1 0.40 6.3 0.06 0.32
1922 315 24.6 11.4 0.49 7.6 0.10 0.55
1923 295 23.9 11.5 0.51 8.4 0.12 0.69
1924 275 23.8 11.4 0.48 8.4 0.14 0.73
1925 280 22.3 11.4 0.54 9.3 0.15 0.78
1926 261 21.7 11.2 0.55 11.1 0.12 0.86
1927 256 21.8 11.4 0.62 11.9 0.12 0.98
1928 97 22.4 11.3 0.49 9.0 0.15 0.89
1929 31 24.8 11.1 0.35 3.9 0.03 0.29
Source: Data are from the 1979 Survey of Veterans.    31
%Hs Yrs Coll %Coll %Hs Yrs Coll %Coll %Hs Yrs Coll %Coll
1915 0.58 1.11 0.18 0.42 0.54 0.08 0.16 0.56 0.10
1916 0.60 1.04 0.17 0.44 0.59 0.92 0.16 0.45 -0.75
1979 0.61 1.01 0.16 0.43 0.65 0.11 0.18 0.36 0.05
1918 0.61 1.05 0.17 0.46 0.77 0.13 0.15 0.28 0.04
1919 0.62 1.05 0.17 0.44 0.68 0.11 0.19 0.37 0.06
1920 0.65 1.20 0.20 0.45 0.66 0.11 0.20 0.53 0.09
1921 0.67 1.22 0.20 0.49 0.74 0.12 0.18 0.48 0.08
1922 0.67 1.30 0.22 0.43 0.57 0.10 0.24 0.73 0.12
1923 0.68 1.33 0.23 0.44 0.55 0.09 0.24 0.79 0.14
1924 0.68 1.42 0.25 0.43 0.54 0.09 0.25 0.88 0.16
1925 0.67 1.42 0.25 0.43 0.62 0.10 0.24 0.80 0.15
1926 0.66 1.40 0.24 0.44 0.68 0.12 0.22 0.72 0.12
1927 0.68 1.42 0.25 0.47 0.73 0.12 0.20 0.69 0.13
1928 0.65 1.24 0.21 0.55 0.89 0.15 0.09 0.34 0.06
1929 0.57 0.78 0.12 0.56 0.94 0.16 0.01 -0.15 -0.04
1930 0.54 0.57 0.07 0.53 0.97 0.16 0.01 -0.40 -0.09
Average 1919-1922 0.65 1.19 0.20 0.45 0.66 0.11 0.20 0.53 0.09
Average 1923-1927 0.67 1.40 0.24 0.44 0.62 0.10 0.23 0.77 0.14
% Increase




Veteran Non Veteran Veteran/Non Veteran
Educational Attainment Among Veterans and Non Veterans
   32
7-15 Year Olds Whose
All 7-15 Year Olds 7-15 Year Olds Whose Fathers Were Born 
with White Fathers Fathers Were Born  Between
Between 1923 and 1930 1918:3 and 1927:3
Father's Year of Birth 1923.4 1926.3 1922.6
(9.07) (2.26) (2.57)
Father WWII Veteran 0.44 0.58 0.81
(0.50) (0.49) (0.39)
Family Income 37,298 39,025 37,623
(21,416) (21,851) (21,958)
Father's Highest 11.2 11.5 11.4
Level of Education (3.40) (3.28) (3.32)
Child Female 0.5 0.49 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
 
Child's Age 10.8 10.7 10.8
 (2.50) (2.52) (2.47)
Child has Repeated 0.18 0.18 0.17
A Grade (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
 
 
Number of Observations 446,226 141,405 160,638
Source: 1960 & 1970 Census.
Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics  33
Father's Yrs of Ed Below Grade-for-Age
Father's Cohort -0.022 0.001
(measured in birthquarters) (0.004) (0.000)
% Korean War Veterans 3.580 -0.166
(0.834) (0.043)
Father's Cohort* % Korea -0.031 0.002
(0.023) (0.001)
 % WWII Veteran 1.231 -0.053
(0.177) (0.011)
 
F-Statistic 48  
Number of Observations 141,405 141,405
Source: 1960 & 1970 Census.
Sample includes all 7-15 year olds with matching fathers born in relevant years.  
Other control variables include family size, child's gender, and an indicator for whether 
the observation comes from the 1960 Census.
Dependent Variable
Table 4
First Stage and Reduced Form Regressions
Using Cross-Cohort Variation in Military Service
Cohorts Born 1923-1930
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
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Table 5
Estimated Effects of Parental Education on Probability  of Being Below Grade-for-Age
Father's Cohort Born Between 1923-1932
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)




























Father's Birth Cohort 1923-1929 1923-1929 1923-1930 1923-1932 1923-1932 1923-1932 1923-1932 1923-1932
Father's Education -0.018 -0.037 -0.043 -0.045 -0.031 -0.032 -0.021 -0.030
(0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017)
% Korean War Veterans -0.065 0.022 -0.012 -0.046 -0.049 -0.049 -0.128 -0.045







C h i l d  a g e  a n d  b q r t r  d u m m i e s xxxxxxxx
L i n e a r  t r e n d xxxxxxxx
L i n e a r  t r e n d   *  %  K o r e a   xxxxxxxx
Quadratic trend xx x
Quadratic trend * % Korea x x x
Number of Observations 126,361 126,361 141,405 168,730 168,730 168,730 168,730 168,098
Source: 1960 & 1970 Census.
Sample includes all 7-15 year olds with matching fathers born in relevant years.  
Other control variables include family size, child's gender, and an indicator for whether the observation comes from the
1960 Census.
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Father's Yrs of Ed Below Grade-for-Age
Father WWII Veteran 1.25 -0.031
(0.064) (0.005)
Father's Cohort*WWII Veteran 0.019 -0.001
(0.004) (0.0002)
F-Statistic 23
Number of Observations 160,638 160,638
Source: 1960 & 1970 Census
Sample includes all 7-15 year olds with matching fathers born in relevant years.
Other control variables include family size, child's gender, child's age dummies, child's
quarter-of-birth dummies, father's age and quarter-of-birth dummies and an indicator for 
whether the observation came from the 1960 Census.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Dependent Variable
Table 6
First Stage and Reduced Form Regressions
Using Cross-Cohort Variation Among Veterans
Cohorts Born Between 1918:3 & 1927:2
   36
Full Set of Additional
OLS IV Interactions Controls
1918:3- 1918:3- 1918:3-
Father's Birth Cohort 1919-1927 1927:2 1920-1926 1927:2 1927:2
Father's Education -0.019 -0.036 -0.036 -0.032 -0.039
(0.0004) (0.010) (0.026) (0.008) (0.012)
Father WWII Veteran -0.013 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.016





Log (Family Income) 0.021
(0.026)
 
Number of Observations 160,638 160,638 128,742 160,638 159,860
Source: 1960 & 1970 Census
Sample includes all 7-15 year olds with matching fathers born in relevant years.
Other control variables include family size, child's gender, child's age dummies, child's
quarter-of-birth dummies, father's age and quarter-of-birth dummies and an indicator for 
whether the observation came from the 1960 Census.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Table 7
Estimated Effects of Parental Education on the Probability of being Below Grade-for-Age
Using Cross-Cohort Variation Among Veterans
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Appendix 
Following Oreopoulos et. al. I classify children as repeaters if their educational 
attainment is below the median for their state, age, quarter of birth and census year cell.  
Specifically, I estimate the number of years that a child “should” have completed based 
on the median grade reached among those who are the same age, and were born in the 
same birthquarter, live in the same state, and were observed in the same census year.  The 
variable REPEAT is then set equal to 1 if a child’s grade is below the median for other 
corresponding children and 0 otherwise.  This measure thus takes into account year and 
state specific characteristics (such as the current cohort’s likely enrollment cutoff date) 
and individual level characteristics (quarter of birth) that affect the age at which the child 
was likely to have enrolled in school.   
This is not a perfect measure.  Students who entered school late, for example, will 
be classified as having been held back, and delayed entry into kindergarten is a fairly 
common practice.  Nine percent of first and second graders in the mid-1990’s had entered 
kindergarten late, whereas only 5-6% had repeated kindergarten (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2000).  In a recent paper, Cascio (2003) compares directly reported 
measures of grade repetition  in the 1992, 1995 and 1999 Current Population Survey 
School Enrollment Supplement to a below grade proxy using educational attainment data 
available in the Census.  She finds that about 20% of all children are incorrectly classified 
by the below grade proxy, and that about 94% of such errors are comprised of children 
who have not repeated a grade but who are classified as such by the proxy.   
  Normally, researchers are not concerned that noisy dependent variables will 
generate biased estimates because measurement error in a normally distributed dependent   38
variable merely generates inefficient standard error estimates.  Cascio points out, 
however, that when the dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the 
individual has repeated a grade, then consistency may be a problem.  Measurement error 
in a binary dependent variable will produce attenuated parameter estimates (Aigner, 
1973; Hausman, 2001).   Cascio estimates that the attenuation factor on her measure of 
grade repetition may be as high as 0.35.  Obviously, it would be preferable to generate 
unbiased estimates, but downward biased estimates will still be informative because the 
prior is that the intergenerational correlation is not wholly causal.  Estimates that are 
statistically different from zero, therefore, still allow me to reject the hypothesis that there 
is not an exogenous effect of parental education on children’s human capital.  In addition, 
because the measure of grade repetition I use is less noisy than Cascio’s, the bias should 
be smaller. 
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